The evaluation of a conceptual model, which is an outcome of a qualitative research, is an arduous task due to the lack of a rigorous basis for evaluation.
Related Work
In order to identify related work, we conducted a systematic review of the proposed models and frameworks of IAS following the methodology used in [19] for the analysis of security ontologies. The search was conducted in the following sources: Google Scholar, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, SCOPUS.
Initially, 52 proposals were selected based on the title, keywords and abstract. The papers were examined and out of them closely related proposals were selected according to the following criteria:
• A model describes the IAS domain. Maturity models were excluded from the analysis because rather than describing the domain, they describe various stages of the Information Security (InfoSec) maturity of an organisation;
• A model addresses the IAS domain in general at a high level of abstraction.
Two domain-specific models (e.g. models for governments and e-business)
were also selected as they exploited a comprehensive approach to IAS;
• A model/framework has a visual representation (although the absence of a visual representation alone was not a reason for exclusion);
Finally, seventeen models and frameworks of IAS were selected for the analysis. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the analysis of the selected for review models. Table 1 gives an overview of the models and outlines (1) the basis for the development of a model, (2) model evaluation methods used, if any, (3) the presence of a visual representation, and (4) the purpose and contribution of a model. Table 2 shows a range of security concepts included in each model. Both tables include the RMIAS as the last row for the comparative analysis. The detailed overview and analysis of the examined models could be found in [3] . To function as an assessment and development framework, to identify and mitigate system vulnerabilities.
Parker [16] elements it embraces). However, there is an aspect that unifies the examined models -all analysed models are destined for, first of all, conveying security knowledge to a wide nonsecurity audience and the target audience typically includes business experts and managers.
Also, the majority of the analysed models attempt to cover the full breadth of the IAS domain [10, 34, 12, 16, 26, 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33] rather than a specific facet of it. In general, only the examination of the different facets of IAS and approaching it from different perspectives allows building a "complete picture" of the domain.
We shall now discuss how well the authors of the examined models inform the readers as to how their models were developed. Parker's model [16] is underpinned by 28 years experience of the author in computer crime and security research. The narrative of the model is rich with real life cases and examples from the author's personal professional experience.
Ransbotham and Mitra [22] in detail describe the development process of the Information Security Compromise Process (ISCP) model. The model is draws upon the examination of four sources of information: (1) the observations of the operations of managed security service provider data centres, (2) interviews with 30 information security experts, (3) analysis of discussions in relevant online groups for understanding motivation for attacks, (4) analysis of security-related guidelines and best practices. The principles of grounded theory were followed upon the analysis of InfoSec standards and the standards are named as in [21, 24] , or upon the analysis of existing models of security [20, 33, 30] , but the analysis of the standards and model is typically not presented. In [10, p.7] , for example, other existing models are criticised as simplistic, static and not being able to deal with the changes within an enterprise and the culture adaptability, but the models this criticisms is addressed to are not named. Due to the sparse documentation of the development process and of the basis for the model development, newly proposed conceptual models of IAS are often seem to be only loosely grounded in existing knowledge, and do no provide any means for linking or comparing the new model with the existing ones.
Next, we shall discuss how the examined models are evaluated. According to Table 1, eight out of seventeen analysed models are not accompanied by any kind of evaluation. It must be noted here, that in Table 1 we discuss how the model is evaluated in the original publication and then state if any other evaluation exisits we are aware of. Despite the absence of formally described evaluation, or the evaluation only through a brief simplified application example, the models such as the CIA-triad, McCumber's Cube [12] and Maconachy et al. model [26] are widely adopted in practice, and even are included in a security standard or training materials (Table 1 ). This could be regarded as an acceptance and a positive evaluation by the IAS community.
The following models [34, 16, 12, 24, 25] draw upon the practical experience of the model developer(s). Empirically developed models provide value to the domain, however, according to the scientific principles of qualitative research they require further unbiased evaluation.
Parker [16] , who suggested the conceptual model of InfoSec which embraces six security characteristics -Confidentiality, Possession or Control, Integrity, Authenticity, Availability, and Utility (also known as Parkerian Hexad), -in order to demonstrate the validity of his model uses information loss scenarios. Real life cases are discussed along each of six security characteristics. In [24] , the authors develop a tool to support the proposed framework, but the validation of the tool is not presented. It is not verified in any way, whether the tool produces valid useful results. [17] . The model proposed by Ransbotham and Mitra [22] is empirically evaluated using alert data from intrusion detection devices.
Only in one out of examined models the number of people involved in the development or evaluation is stated. In [22] , 30 information security experts were interviewed, however, the details of the interview process and full transcripts, as well as the profiles of the interviewees are not available to the reader.
In the examined literature, we did not encounter models which were thoroughly evaluated using both empirical and analytical evaluation, and a multi-criteria approach. Often, the conceptual models of IAS are presented in the format of a position paper and are not substantiated by any evaluation. Analytical evaluation via comparison with other existing model is typically absent in the examined publications. The models specifically designed for communication purposes and specifically targeted at a non-technical audience are not tested for their accessibility to the target audience, or the ease to understand and use. Overall, the involvement of people other than the model developer(s) in the evaluation of models is limited.
In this research, we aim to remedy the drawbacks found in the existing literature with regard to the evaluation of conceptual model of the IAS domain.
Finally, it must be notated that the type of publications examined vary between a conference papers ( [30, 26, 31] ), a book ( [16] ) and a white paper ( [21] ). Understandably, it is very difficult to present in one, even a journal paper, not to mention a conference paper with a highly restricted page count, both the model itself and its sound evaluation. Hence, the author(s) of a conceptual model for presenting the model and its evaluation should either (1) consider such publication formats as a book, thesis or white paper, or (2) publish a series of follow-up papers.
RMIAS and its Use
The true novelty of the RMIAS is in bringing together the segregated, discrete knowledge of the IAS domain in a form suitable for a wide range of experts with different technical, non-technical, security and non-security backgrounds.
The RMIAS, which is depicted in Figure 1 , has four dimensions (while covering the key concepts of IAS, four dimensions of the RMIAS do not overlap and do not duplicate each other):
• Security Development Life Cycle Dimension (top left quadrant) illustrates the progression of IAS along the Information System Development Life Cycle (ISDLC);
• Information Taxonomy Dimension (top right quadrant) outlines the characteristics of information being protected;
• Security Goals Dimension (bottom right quadrant) outlines the set of eight security goals, also referred to as the IAS-octave, which includes Confidentiality, Integrity, Avail-ability, Accountability, Auditability, Authenticity & Trustworthiness, Non-repudiation, and Privacy.
• Security Countermeasures Dimension (bottom left quadrant) categorises security countermeasures.
The RMIAS is a generic abstraction. Before its use in the context of a specific organisation the following elements of the RMIAS should be adapted:
1. The generic security development life cycle should be replaced with the one specific to the organisation; and 2. The information taxonomy should be extended with the information sensitivity classifications and the location classification which are specific to the organisation.
In addition to the descriptive knowledge described above, the RMIAS also embeds the methodological knowledge 3 . Further this sections explains how the RMIAS may assist with the development of an Information Security Policy Document (ISPD). There is a hierarchy of security policies, where each policy document covers security at a different level of detail [36] . The number of all possible combinations of the categories of information and security goals (which is also the number of rows in the table) is calculated as follows:
where
• N -the number of possible combinations of the categories of information and security goals,
• N f -the number of the forms of information,
• Ns -the number of the states of information,
• Nsen -the number of the levels of information sensitivity,
• N l -the number of locations, and
• N SG -the number of security goals. enables the traceability and defensibility of security decisions.
In row 1 of Table 3 , no security countermeasures are required to protect privacy of a Public document as there are no such scenarios in which privacy may be violated by misusing a Public document. Hence, for this combination no security policy statement is developed.
Similarly, in row 2, the non-repudiation of a Public document poses no threats to Translate and this combination of attributes and the security goal is excluded from further consideration.
However, while non-repudiation is not critical for a Public electronic document located in a controlled environment, availability is. The scenarios in which the availability of a Public electronic document located in a controlled environment may be breached may be as follows:
(1) an employee deletes the document by mistake, (2) the physical damage of the server on which the document is stored (e.g. due to fire or flood), (3) the external host of the document does not provide access to the document in violation of a service agreement, etc. Row 3 specifies that the availability of the electronic documents, which are classified as Public and stored in a controlled location, must be ensured by means of creating backups both on an external hard drive and in the cloud using one of online backup services.
Row 4 contains a security policy statement which dictates that for the Confidential paper documents which are stored in a controlled location (e.g. printed financial and audit reports stored in Translate's office) an organisational security countermeasures should be put in place, namely, the documents must be stored in a locked safe and it must be ensured that only authorised personnel have access to the safe. Row 5 declares that Confidential paper documents cannot be transmitted to an uncontrolled environment.
Row 6 refers to the accountability for the use/misuse of information classified as proprietary while it is being processed in the paper form in a controlled location. To achieve accountability the access to Proprietary paper documents must be logged (organisational security countermeasure) and non-disclosure agreements must be in place with every employee of Translate who has access to the information classified as Proprietary (legal security countermeasure).
Evaluation Methodology and Criteria
A conceptual model may be evaluated analytically or empirically [38, 39] . The merit of a method embedded into a conceptual model or of a modelling technique could only be realised if it is effective in practice. A method ("knowledge how") as opposed to a thesis ("knowledge that") is not either true or false, but is either effective or not [41] . Where analytical evaluation could only make predictions about the effectiveness of a method and its potential adoption in practice, an empirical evaluation may refute or corroborate results of analytical evaluation as well as predictions from theories [42] .
In addition to a higher cost and difficulties in administration, in comparison with analytical evaluation, empirical evaluation suffers from other drawbacks. A low motivation of participants and a danger of the misunderstanding of an evaluated model or method by participants are only some of them. Participants are also often affected by additional factors that may not always be accounted for by research (e.g. mood, language understanding, attitude to an experiment). Furthermore, several empirical studies with a significant number of participants should be conducted and the results should be repeated before any conclusion may be taken as final.
Since both evaluation approaches -analytical and empirical -have their limitations [43] , a combination of different evaluation methods was exploited to overcome the limitations of separate methods. A evaluation route which includes different types of evaluation was designed and pursued in order to test the hypothesis declared in Section 1 and to demonstrate the merits of the RMIAS in a valid sustainable way.
The evaluation of the RMIAS is intended to verify both the scientific value and pragmatic value of the RMIAS by combining the following methods of evaluation:
• To test the scientific value:
(1) Grounding in the existing literature; Since this justification is not deemed to be sufficient, to prove the scientific value of the RMIAS further, the model is evaluated analytically by the model developer for its compliance with the quality criteria of conceptual models. This criteria are introduced further in this section. In Section 5, the RMIAS is also compared with other IAS conceptual models and it is analytically demonstrated that the RMIAS outweighs the other models in terms of completeness and accuracy. The developer possesses the in-depth understanding of the model and is well equipped to perform analytical evaluation. However, such evaluation is subjective because the developer is inevitably inclined towards her proposal. Furthermore, the evaluation results are unavoidably affected by the perspective and background of the evaluator.
In order to complement and deal with the limitations of the analytical evaluation mentioned above, a series of semi-structured interviews 5 with IAS experts, who are impartial For the validation of the methodological knowledge of the RMIAS it was essential to empirically demonstrate the practical value of the model [44] . The practical value of the RMIAS (i.e. how viable and useful the model is in practice) was tested via the workshops with MSc students and IAS practitioners and via a case study.
Many evaluation frameworks agree on the need for a multi-criteria approach. For the evaluation of the RMIAS we adopted the criteria which are suggested in [7] and further elaborated in [38] :
1. Simplicity -among models, equal in other ways, preference is given to the simpler model;
2. Accuracy -a model as well as the concepts it incorporates should be accurate and explicit;
3. Scope -a model should cover the broader scope of a modelled domain and should not overlook essential concepts;
4.
Systematic power -a model should help to organise concepts and relationships between them in a meaningful systematic way;
5.
Explanatory power -a model should assist with explaining and predicting a phenomena;
6. Reliability -a model should be valid (applicable) in all situations for which it is designed (in our case, we interpret it so that the model should be applicable to a wide range of organisations) and should lead to a similar understanding when applied to the same phenomenon by different users;
7. Validity -a model should provide valid representations and findings; and 8.
Fruitfulness -desirably a model should suggest research problems and hypotheses for testing.
The choice of these evaluation criteria is driven by the following considerations:
• Purpose: These criteria are specifically destined for the evaluation of a conceptual model of an area of research (i.e. a reference model).
which covers some questions and helps to keep the focus of the discussion, but there is still a room for openness, flexibility and improvisation [43] .
• Application: These criteria are applied to the evaluation of information seeking and retrieval research by the authors of the criteria [7] . The criteria are also exploited for the evaluation of a definition of an IS [38] , independently of the authors of the criteria.
Other evaluation frameworks present only a theoretical basis, but do not provide any application examples.
• Completeness: The set of quality criteria is more comprehensive than the sets of the quality characteristics found in other proposals.
The RMIAS was analytically evaluated against these eight criteria by the model developers and by the IAS experts interviewed. The workshops and case study contributed to the evaluation of the RMIAS with regard to reliability and validity.
Analytical Evaluation and Analysis of the Interviews
Section 5.1 provides the details of the interviewing process according to the rules outlined in [43] . The comparison with other models is supported by Table 2 which shows a range of security concepts included in each model.
Arrangement of the Interviews
For the interviews, the professionals and academics who have experience in the IAS domain or related areas were targeted. Twenty six experts who participated in the evaluation, first, were given a presentation which briefly discussed the existing models of IAS and described the RMIAS in detail. Then, the participants challenged the model in a question and answer session. Three out of five presentations were followed by a workshop , where the participants used the RMIAS for the ISPD development.
The interviews were arranged either on the same day following the presentations or, in several cases, at a later date. Each interview lasted between 30 -60 minutes. At the beginning of an interview, the purpose of an interview was communicated to an interviewee and reassurance was given that in all written work the responses will appear anonymously. The participants were also presented with the definition of evaluation criteria as adopted from [7] and [38] , and summarised in Section 4.
To facilitate the interviews, a questionnaire was developed based on the chosen set of The interviews were semi-structured. The questionnaire provided a template for the discussion, but the participants were invited to give extended answers and to explain their position. At the end, the respondents were invited to provide any comments that were not captured by the questions. Both the transcripts and notes were used as the recording technique. All presentations, interviews, workshop and the analysis of the results were carried out by the authors. With seven interviewees the interviewer was acquainted as with colleagues prior to the presentation and interviewing procedure, and two of seven interviewees were exposed to the early versions of the RMIAS and knew the details of the development process.
Other interviewees the interviewer had not previously met.
Overall, 26 full responses were received over the period between November 2012 and April 2013. The experience of the respondents varies from 1 to 32 years with the average of 9.9
years. Among the interviewees there were 5 academics, 15 practitioners and 6 experts whose experience comes from both research and practice. The respondents specialise in the diverse range of the aspects of IAS and in related domains, including cyber security and defence, system modelling, requirement engineering, trusted computing, forensics etc. The profile of the interviewees, the detailed version of which could be found in [3] , confirms that the RMIAS was evaluated by the independent experienced audience and that the RMIAS was approached from different perspectives conditioned by the backgrounds of the respondents.
The transcripts of interviews could be found in [3] . Due to the space limitations, in this paper we use thin description 6 of interview results while presenting the analysis of the interviews.
Simplicity of the RMIAS
Simplicity is a subjective characteristic: what is simple for one individual, may be complex for another. Objectively, simplicity may be analytically evaluated against other models. In comparison with other models (e.g. McCumber's cube [12] , Maconachy et al. [26] ), the RMIAS is more complex. The RMIAS has a wider scope than other models and, therefore, it inevitably has more elements and is less simple. However, according to the Ockham's razor principle, the simple explanation or model should only be preferred until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. It may be hypothesised that the RMIAS has greater explanatory power than the other models because it may represent more security issues and solutions, and it also makes the interrelationships between the IAS concepts explicit. This statement is supported by Table 2 which shows that none other of the examined models covers the same range of security concepts as the RMIAS.
The RMIAS also attempts to cover the full breadth of the IAS domain. As the result of this, in the trade-off between simplicity and scope (completeness), in the RMIAS, the preference is given to the completeness.
Despite being more complex than other analysed models according to the analytical evaluation conducted by the authors, the RMIAS is considered as relatively simple and easy to grasp by the interviewed experts and even by newcomers to the IAS field as discussed in Section 6. In order to enhance its intelligibility, the RMIAS is duly accompanied by a narrative.
The definitions of every element of the RMIAS are provided and the interrelationships between the elements are explained. The visual appearance also aims to improve the intelligibility of the RMIAS. During the workshops, the RMIAS was presented to the audience which had different levels of expertise in IAS. The feedback from the participants indicates that even the novices to IAS find the model simple and easy to understand. As discussed in Section 6, the novice participants along with more experienced ones successfully used the RMIAS for the development of an ISPD during the evaluation workshops.
In the interviews, there were two questions capturing the opinion of interviewees with regard to the simplicity of the RMIAS:
• Question 4 -Are the elements of the RMIAS simple?
• Question 5 -Are the relationships between the elements simple? (The relationships are illustrated by arrows.)
Twenty-two out of twenty-six interviewees described the elements of the RMIAS as simple.
Although two respondents found the elements of the RMIAS simple, they suggested to change 
Accuracy of the RMIAS
The comparison of the RMIAS with its predecessors demonstrates that the RMIAS is more accurate than other analysed models, since it includes a more detailed taxonomy of information and classification of security countermeasures, and embraces the broader set of security goals ( Table 2 ). The RMIAS also contributes to accuracy by underscoring the distinction between security goals and security countermeasures, and by outlining the interrelationships between the concepts of IAS.
In the interviews, two questions were intended to capture the opinion of the respondents with regard to the accuracy of the RMIAS:
• Question 6 -Are the classifications included in the model accurate (the information taxonomy, the set of security goals and the types of security countermeasures)?
• Question 7 -Are the interrelationships between the elements of the model accurately Three respondents were not sure about their answers.
Overall, the accuracy of the RMIAS was evaluated by the respondents positively. Eighteen out of 26 respondents (69%) agreed with the accuracy of the elements of the model. As for the relationships between the dimensions, depicted by the arrows in Figure 1 , while 14 respondents (54%) stated that all interrelationships are accurately described, 9 (34%) pointed out that one out of four arrows is not accurately described and further clarifications are needed.
Scope of the RMIAS
Scope covered (completeness) has a particular importance for the RMIAS. First, in order to convey the complexity and heterogeneity of IAS, the RMIAS must cover the full range of IAS concepts required by the target model of the RMIAS. Second, the RMIAS serves as the basis for the semantics of an IAS modelling notation in [3, 18] . The above two reasons make it critical to ensure that the RMIAS covers an adequate scope and that all key IAS concepts are covered by the model.
The key source that inspired the work on the RMIAS was McCumber's Cube [12] , published in 1991, and its updated version -the model of Maconachy et al. [26] released in 2001.
These models were included in security training and education programs in the US. The RMIAS builds upon these two models and extends them with new security concepts reflecting the ever-changing landscape of the IAS domain and responing to the call for a regular revision of a conceptual model of the IAS domain stated in [16, 34] It is pointed out by well recognised security experts that the CIA-triad does not adequately reflect the contemporary state of IAS and requires an extension [16, 37] . Notably, the RMIAS addresses this call and extends the CIA-triad drawing upon the existing literature and other models analysed.
The greater scope of the RMIAS is demonstrated by means of benchmarking the RMIAS against other models. other models evidences that the RMIAS is more complete than any of the analysed models because the RMIAS (1) outlines an extensive list of security goals which is supported by the analysis, (2) incorporates the categorisation of security countermeasures which embraces all possible types of countermeasures at the high level of abstraction, and (3) includes the drivers underpinning IAS decisions. The wide scope of the RMIAS comes from adopting the broad view on an information system as a socio-technical system and from interpreting IAS as a complex multifaceted discipline, rather than a purely technical one.
In the interview, there were two questions related to the scope (completeness) of the RMIAS:
• Question 8 -Does the model include all elements/concepts essential for the IAS domain? If, in your opinion, there are some essential, but missing from the model elements/concepts, please, name them.
• Question 9 -Does the model include any elements that are not relevant to the IAS domain?
In question 8, eighteen out of twenty-six respondents confirmed that the RMIAS is complete and covers the appropriate for its purposes scope. Five respondents suggested to add new elements to the RMIAS such as collaborative aspect, risk analysis/assessment, user scenarios, additional emphasis on human factor, and business goals.
The uncertainty regarding the completeness of the RMIAS expressed by the participants is expected. A complex domain such as IAS may be approached from various perspectives which would focus on different elements of the domain. The elements, which the respondents suggested to include in the RMIAS, are already covered by the model, at least, to a certain degree. For instance, the collaborative aspect is captured via the information attribute location. Risk analysis is covered by the RMIAS to the degree which is required for the purposes of this model as discussed in the previous chapter. The importance of the human-factor is explicitly outlined in the RMIAS by distinguishing a whole category of human-oriented security countermeasures. Furthermore, the need to take into account the human factor during all stages of the security development life cycle, and not only at the stage of system design, is acknowledged in the RMIAS. The comment regarding business goals concerns the understanding of the place and role of IAS in an organisation, rather than the structure of the IAS domain. In agreement with the need for alignment of security goals with business objectives, the narrative of the RMIAS also states that IAS does not exists for its own sake and is only used by an organisation in order to achieve its overall goals. Echoing this, the role of IAS as a business enabler is also discussed in our earlier publication [6] .
In question 9, twenty-four respondents stated that there are no elements in the RMIAS that are not relevant to the IAS domain. Only two respondents expressed concern about the relevance of several security goals within the IAS-octave providing the following comments:
(1) "Privacy and Auditability could be argued. (Good you have included them anyway.)"
and (2) 
Systematic Power of the RMIAS
The RMIAS systematises the IAS domain by distinguishing four key dimensions and, then, elaborating each dimension in depth. The RMIAS brings together these four dimensions and explains the correlations between them.
Question 10 in the questionnaire attends to the systematic power of the RMIAS and was worded as follows: Does the model organise elements of the IAS domain and relationships between them in a structured, systematic way?
Answering this question, twenty-two respondents acknowledged that the RMIAS presents the IAS domain is a systematic way. One respondent was not sure about the answer. Three respondents expressed reservations regarding the systematic power of the RMIAS with one of them saying "I am not convinced it does. There are a number of reasons for my view, not least of which is the lack of "systemic understanding" among managers. I fear the arrows in the model will be interpreted as a time dependency, rather than a logical interdependency.".
Explanatory Power of the RMIAS
The RMIAS may assist with the elimination of omissions and contradictions in ISPDs.
It helps to identify overlooked threats, i.e. predict possible security violations and search for required countermeasures. Due to the fact that the RMIAS is more complete and accurate than the other models it may be hypothesised that the RMIAS may explain and indicate more security issues. The following example confirms this hypothesis. If accountability and legal security countermeasures are not included in a model (our analysis confirms that none of the examined models includes accountability, and legal and organisational security countermeasures at the same time [3] ), then the model could not assist with explaining security violations that stem out of the absence of legal measures that help to keep misusers accountable for their actions. E.g. a bank logs an unauthorised access of an employee to confidential account information of bank's customers. Then, the bank attempts to sue the employee for the information misuse. The access log (e.g. the evidence received by means of a technical security countermeasure) may be insufficient in a legal mitigation, because the prosecution of an employee also depends on the clarity of the bank policies regarding information access and on the knowledge of the employee regarding his/her access rights which may be confirmed by attended security training and by a signed information access policy (i.e. organisational, human-oriented and legal countermeasures) [45] .
Question 11, which was worded as "Might the Model assist with explaining (tracing back) and predicting issues related to IAS?", was intended to capture the opinion of the respondent with regard to the explanatory power of the RMIAS.
Answering this question, ten respondents clearly saw the RMIAS as a tool that may help to explain IAS issues: "I think your model will assist in predicting issues and tracing them back thanks to the goals, which occupy the third dimension of your model" and "Yes, using the model you would be able to trace back logically and demonstrate how an element of InfoSec had been missed."
Seven respondents found that the RMIAS has explanatory power, but only with some limitations. For example, it may help only to explain security events, but not to predict them.
One of the comments was as follows: "Security audit based on the model may give some level of traceability. The model could be used retrospectively, to trace back security incidents, to see where things went wrong. But to predict will be very difficult." Six respondents were not sure about the ability of the RMIAS with helping to predict/trace back security issues. Three respondents answered in the negative to question 11.
Reliability of the RMIAS
The reliability of the RMIAS is evaluated through the examination of two aspects.
First is the assurance that the RMIAS is applicable for the majority of organisations irrespectively of size and domain (wide applicability). The RMIAS draws upon a broad spectrum of IAS literature which synthesises the IAS practice of many organisations. Therefore, the applicability of the RMIAS to the majority of organisations is anticipated. Further, the flexibility and adjustability of the RMIAS makes it widely applicable. The model outlines a template which may be adjusted to suit a specific organisation. During the workshops the applicability of the RMIAS in the context of an SME is empirically tested. The applicability of the RMIAS in the context of a large enterprise is practically demonstrated by the case study. The outcomes of the workshops and case study are discussed in Sections 6 and 7
respectively. Second is the assurance that the RMIAS leads to similar understanding when applied by different users. This aspect is tested via the workshops as well.
Question 12 gauges the reliability of the RMIAS:
• Question 12 -In your opinion, would the model be applicable for the majority of business organisations? Are there any industries or types of organisations where the model would not be applicable (explain your opinion)?
Answering question 12, sixteen respondents consider the RMIAS to be applicable to any organisation without exceptions (two respondents specifically pointed to its applicability in the military and healthcare environments). In the opinion of five respondents the RMIAS had limited applicability. One respondent had concern about the applicability of security goals and their interpretation within the healthcare domain. One respondent considers the RMIAS to be more suitable for smaller businesses with less resources as it may be hard for large scale organisations to use the model, while another, on the contrary, stated that the RMIAS is not applicable to SMEs.
Validity of the RMIAS
The RMIAS provides guidance for the development of an ISPD (Section 3). Thus, the validity of the RMIAS is tested by evaluating whether the RMIAS facilitates the development of an ISPD via the workshops and case study as considered in Sections 6 and 7. (2) for producing valid results there must be a risk analysis methodology aligned with the model, and (3) the used of the model may be labour intensiveness. The authors agree with the comments provided by the interviewees and discuss these comments later on in this paper.
Two respondents answered in the negative to question 13. Eight respondents were not able, based on the provided information, to judge the ability of the RMIAS to render valid results.
Overall, 16 respondents (62%) evaluated the validity of the RMIAS positively, with 5 out of them noting additional influences and needs that must be taken into account.
As the RMIAS provides a framework for structuring thinking about IAS, the results produced using the model will inevitably be affected by the characteristics of an individual applying it. The RMIAS, at least at this stage, was intended as an automated decision support tool that would completely exclude the need for expertise and produce valid results irrespectively.
Answering the concern of the interviewees regarding the labour intensiveness, it must be acknowledged that the application of the RMIAS may potentially produce an extensive list of security statement. However, the purpose of the RMIAS is to helps to identify a complete list of situations or scenarios where information may need protection. This inevitably will lead to a large amount of information that must be processed. It may be considered in future how the development of a security policy document using the RMIAS may be simplified and optimised without compromising on the completeness or scope of a security policy document. Also the amount of data generated using the RMIAS will depend on the complexity of business and other organisation specifics. It is assumed that the larger organisations and organisations for whom the protection of information is more critical have more resources available to assist with the generation of security policy and must allocated them more readily.
The uncertainty of a large number of respondents regarding the questioned ability of the RMIAS may be explained by the insufficient amount of information they had to make a judgement about it. The intention of the interviews was to capture the initial judgement of the experts regarding the validity of the RMIAS. It was not feasible to present to all experts interview the examples of the use of the RMIAS in several case studies. In order to further test the validity of the RMIAS, the workshops and case study were undertaken where the participants had a chance to use the RMIAS in practice. The results of the workshops and a case study are discussed in the subsequent sections.
Fruitfulness of the RMIAS
Fruitfulness is a desirable characteristics of a conceptual model to suggest research problems and hypothesis to be verified [38, 7] .
The RMIAS, in conjunction with the examination of the literature, may assist in a search for research problems. It is described below how it may be done. Using the information taxonomy of the RMIAS, the category of information is identified. A security goal is specified for this category. The RMIAS suggests to search for a security countermeasure that may help to ensure the goal for the category of information. If the literature review shows that such countermeasure is not present (or the existing countermeasure is not efficient), then the need for a new countermeasure is detected. The RMIAS also points to a need to explore whether there are methods to cover security goals, countermeasures, and the information taxonomy at different stages of the security development life cycle.
Two questions in the interviews were aimed at the evaluation of the fruitfulness of the RMIAS:
• Question 14 -Does the model provide a convenient structure for framing the existing research? How would you position your area of research/practice using the model?
• Question 15 -Could the model assist with pointing out the gaps in the existing research/practice?
Only eight respondents had background in research to enable them to answer these questions. In question 14, while two respondents were not sure about the answer, six agreed that the RMIAS provides a convenient structure for framing research and were able to pinpoint the place of their own research topic within the model. In question 15, seven out of eight respondents agreed that the RMIAS may point out at the gaps in research ...due to the way the model splits out the different dimensions of InfoSec and further splits these down prompting thought on each individual aspect of information security and one respondent was not sure about the answer. In both questions the vast majority of the interviews has confirmed the fruitfulness of the RMIAS.
In this project, we had only a small number of participants to test the fruitfulness of the RMIAS. Hence, the conclusion we make about the fruitfulness of the RMIAS is only suggested by our results, and further interviews and case-studies are needed in the future to fully corroborate our conclusion. We also deemed it incorrect to exclude fruitfulness from the evaluation due to this reason. Randomly excluding criteria from the evaluation would hinder the comprehensiveness of the evaluation, though the evaluation result regarding with this criterion must be taken with greater caution due to the lower number of participants.
Evaluation Workshops
Three evaluation workshops were conducted. The first workshop was with the group of Each group was given a one-hour presentation of the RMIAS followed by a one-hour workshop where the participants applied the RMIAS to the case study of Translate. The case study outlines the current security arrangements of Translate, the problems which the company was facing, the changes the business went through recently as well as the details of the information classification scheme of the company. The participants were asked, while working in a team of 2-4 people, to develop an Information Security Policy Document (ISPD)
for Translate using the RMIAS. The case study and the task as they were given to the participants are presented in [3, App. 5].
During two workshops, 6 teams were formed. The participants were allowed to refer to ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 standards. The teams followed the methodology for the derivation of an ISPD described in Sections 3. First, the teams produced tables in MS Excel which they populated with the combinations of four information attributes and security goals.
Then, the groups discussed each combination and attempted to work out a scenario for each combination and make a judgement on whether a scenario posses any threats to Translate. If they answered positively on the last question then the teams identified security countermeasures that contribute to the achievement of the security goal for the category of information under consideration. The teams developed between 3 to 8 security policy statements each.
The workshops reproduced how the RMIAS must be utilised in real cases with the only exception that the risk analysis was not conducted following any particular methodology, but rather left for the judgement of the participants. At the end of the workshops, the participants provided feedback.
Since the RMIAS only provides a template to be filled in with policies, the quality of policy statements strongly depends on the knowledge and experience of its developer(s) and on information they have at hand, as was also pointed out at by the experts interviewed (Section 5.8). The viability and compliance to reality of the security statements developed by the teams were assessed by the authors and, then, confirmed with the IAS expert who has security experience both in academia and industry, and was present at the workshops as an observer. The actual ISPD statements developed by the participants of the workshops may be found in [3, App. 9] . It was concluded that all statements are valid and comply with reality.
The purpose of the workshops was to observe how well the RMIAS is comprehended by the participants with the different levels of expertise in IAS and whether the participants are able to use the RMIAS while working in a team, and to gather the feedback of the participants on the use of the RMIAS. Further, we present outline our observations and the feedback on the use of the RMIAS provided by the participants.
The workshops confirmed that the majority of the participants managed to get a solid understanding of the RMIAS and how a policy document may be developed using the RMIAS.
There was only one team of three MSc students who significantly struggled with the task.
However, after additional help the team managed to produce 3 valid policy statements. Other teams worked independently and only in several cases called for minor clarifications.
The final feedback of the participants indicates that the participants appreciate that the RMIAS helps with profiling information -"the complete registry of all information organisa-tion has is good because nothing is omitted from a policy document". Each team was able to identify the scenario in which a specific category of information needed protection from threats referred to by a specific security goal.
The IAS-octave was found by the participants useful. According to the feedback of the teams "the IAS-octave covers all possible issues with information". The participants also appreciated the help the RMIAS provides with the identification of scenarios in which information needs protection.
There was only one MSc student who struggled with the concept of security goal. The student suggested to include in the final table, along with the name of a security goal, more detailed description of attacks and threats to which the goal refers to. This approach is not optimal, as it leads to the duplication of information. However, it is suggested when presenting the RMIAS in future and, the IAS-octave specifically, to provide an audience with more examples of threats and attacks which pose threats to each security goal.
According to the comments of the participants of the workshops, using the RMIAS it was easier to see how an ISPD must change (i.e. which security statements to be included, The team said that discussing how different security goals may be achieved for knowledge or verbal information greatly assists with the identification of security violations scenarios and, consequently, security statements covering knowledge protection, which would unlikely emerge during the work on an ISPD otherwise.
The group of practitioners who participated in the third workshop indicated that it is always challenging to reflect all possible threat situations in an ISPD as there is no framework based on which one can gauge whether everything is dealt with or not. The group agreed that the RMIAS provides useful guidance on how the complete set of such situations may be determined. The group also agreed that the IAS-octave certainly prompts one to consider more threat scenarios than, for example, the CIA-triad. Although this group originally voiced a concern about the overlap between some security goals, after working on the Translate case study the group agreed that the explicit acknowledgement of all eight goals of the IASoctave was helpful, specifically, for the audience inexperienced in IAS. If any of the goals was omitted from the model, then an organisation relies purely on the knowledge and expertise of an expert developing an ISPD to identify and tackle threats to information which the omitted goal covers.
The group of participants from Cranfield University also suggested that the RMIAS may serve as a tool for security audit and benchmarking by large and small organisations. The participant, who had experience in the field of IAS consultancy also predicted that the RMIAS may serve as a consultancy framework.
Case Study
This is a case study of an executive non-departmental public body based in the UK. The name of the organisation may not be revealed due to the non-disclosure agreement. Further in the text, the organisation is referred to as the Agency. The Agency has multiple offices across the UK and employs over 1000 people. While in the workshops the RMIAS was exploited to produce an ISPD from scratch, in this case study the RMIAS was employed to structure and organise the existing ISPDs.
The Agency provided the authors with four ISPDs: (1) Agency data security standard (8 pages); (2) Classifying and handling sensitive information policy (25 pages); (3) Sending, transferring and storing data policy (3 pages); and (4) Protective security policy (3 pages).
The documents were initially analysed to identify which elements of the RMIAS are present.
The examination of documents confirmed that all elements of the RMIAS were present in the policies. The precise values of the elements were extracted and are stated below.
The organisation uses the UK government sensitivity classification and marking scheme:
Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Restricted, Protect and Unclassified [46] 7 .
The following locations are listed in the examined policy documents: the Agency offices; the supporting IT company; the third parties storing information on behalf of the Agency;
home environment (employees who work from home); and locations other than the above. It was agreed to categorise the locations as suggested in Section 3 into controlled, uncontrolled and partially controlled.
The state of information is acknowledged in the analysed documents. It was specifically noted that countermeasures were specified for the protection of information at the stages of creating and destruction as well as at the stages of processing, transmission and storage. This further confirmed the correctness of the incorporation of these stages into the information taxonomy of the RMIAS.
Security countermeasures of all four types, namely legal, technical, organisational and human-oriented were encountered in the analysed policies. As it was anticipated, the analysed documents stated only the CIA-triad (confidentiality, integrity and availability) as the security goals to be achieved.
After all elements of the RMIAS were identified, the RMIAS was adjusted with the values specific to the Agency (e.g. information sensitivity and location classification). The IASoctave replaced the CIA-triad and was used in the analysis.
Using the values of information sensitivity and location specific to the Agency, a table was created as described in Section 3. The table was populated with all possible combinations of the values of such parameters as information form, information sensitivity, information location, information state and security goal.
Then each security statement in the analysed documents was examined and assigned in to the appropriate combination of the information category and security goal (i.e. the column Security Countermeasure of the table in a specific row in the table was populated with the description of this security countermeasure).
For example, when the statement "Documents marked Confidential may be taken home only with a written approval of a designated person" was examined it was assigned to the row with the following characteristics: information form -paper, sensitivity -Confidential, location -partially controlled, state -transmission, security goal -confidentiality.
In the final table the rows were flagged which contained the combinations of information categories and security goals for which no security controls were specified in the analysed documents (i.e. the last column of the final table was empty for that row). These rows identify the situations which were not covered by the examined ISPDs.
The final table was presented to and discussed with the Information Security Officer of the Agency. Two meetings took place. At the first meeting the RMIAS was presented and initial information was received from the Agency. The exchange of email helped to identify the missing information. At the second meeting the finalised table was presented to the Agency, and feedback was received. Both meetings were run informally and comments were provided in a free form. The feedback received is discussed below.
The Agency had no other model of IAS in place and willingly adopted the RMIAS.
According to the Agency, the RMIAS "makes perfect sense" in the context of the Agency and provides a way of approaching security in a more structured way.
At the first meeting, the Agency saw the IAS-octave as the main advantage of the RMIAS.
Since the existing policies of the Agency were confined to the CIA-triad, the Agency anticipated that considering the wider spectrum of threats beyond the CIA-triad may help to improve the policy documents and identify the threats that were potentially overlooked. The
Agency also positively evaluated the segregation of legal security countermeasures. A discussion took place on whether it is legitimate to consider law as a security countermeasure and the agreement was reached that it is, since an organisation may refer to law in order to protect its information.
At the second meeting, it was agreed by the Agency that the information taxonomy and security goals dimensions of the RMIAS provide a basis for a good coverage of all potential situations in which information needs protection ("misuse cases"). It was confirmed that by using the RMIAS, more potentially dangerous cases where information needs protection may be identified.
The policy statements of the Agency were spread over a number of documents developed and updated by a number of employees at different time. Therefore, the fact that the RMIAS helps to organise the policies extracted from various policy documents in a form which is easy to manage and analyse, was seen as one of the major positive outcomes of the use of the RMIAS.
The analysis and structuring of the Agency's security policies enabled the Agency to see the range of the countermeasures of different types declared in various documents and applicable to the same category of information for achieving the same security goal. This provided a basis for a cost-effectiveness and efficiency analysis, and for the improvements of the ISPDs (i.e. duplicated countermeasures may be removed or the most cost-effective alternative may be chosen). The Agency also expressed interest in a software system which will be based on the RMIAS and will provide security recommendations for particular situations and particular categories of documents.
The case study confirmed that the RMIAS (1) helps to organise, in a manageable form, security policies spread over multiple documents, (2) permits the tracing of the contradictory security policy statements, and, most importantly, (3) facilitates the identification of omissions in security policies.
Discussion
The results of the interviews are summarised in Figure 3 respondents. Overall, more than 50% of the interviewees endorsed the RMIAS for simplicity, accuracy, covered scope, systematic power, reliability and validity.
The participants of the workshops, even those who had limited experience in IAS, were able to exploit the RMIAS for the development of an ISPD after only a one-hour presentation of the model. This also supports the hypothesis that the RMIAS represents the essence of the IAS domain at a level which is easy to comprehend even by a novice audience. As was noted by the participants of the workshops, the RMIAS is a more effective way of describing IAS than as a set of definitions or rules. Many participants stated that with the RMIAS they acquired a more comprehensive vision of IAS (one participant even described it as "eye-opening"). Many participants were able to pinpoint the place of their personal topic of interest in IAS in the overall picture of the domain.
During the presentations and workshops, the IAS-octave usually sparked intensive discussions. The participants challenged the meaning of and the differences between security goals. In these discussions, the IAS-octave was acknowledged to be more comprehensive than other sets of goals (e.g. the CIA-triad) and to cover all known to the participants threats to information. No additional security goals were suggested during the interviews or workshops.
The evaluation results confirm the reliability of the RMIAS in two ways. First, the results of the interviews corroborate the applicability of the RMIAS for the majority of organisations.
More than 50% of the experts anticipate no restrictions to the fitness of the RMIAS in the context of any specific domain (Section 5.7 -question 12 in Figure 3) . Furthermore, the case study demonstrated how a large-scale organisation may avail of the RMIAS, while in the workshops the RMIAS was successfully applied in the context of an SME. Second, the workshops, demonstrated that the RMIAS leads to the congruous understanding of the IAS Figure 3 : Summary of the Interview Answers domain when applied by different users. The participants of the workshops were able to work as a cohort to produce security policy statements using the RMIAS.
The analytical evaluation of the RMIAS as well as the interviews with the IAS domain experts did not explicitly cover the cognitive effectiveness of the visual appearance of the RMIAS. However, during the workshop at Cranfield and Cardiff Universities, while providing the feedback on the RMIAS, the participants of the workshops explicitly highlighted the clarity and cognitive effectiveness of the RMIAS as one of the strengths of the model. This work does not make any strong claims with regard to the cognitive effectiveness of the RMIAS because it was not the primary focus of this research project. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that to the best of the authors' knowledge, the RMIAS is the first model which provides the design rationale for its visual appearance. However, further work regarding the visual appearance of the RMIAS and its evaluation is required.
The workshops and case study which tested the reliability and validity of the RMIAS demonstrated that the RMIAS (a) is applicable to large and small organisations of different domains, (b) leads to similar understanding of the IAS domain when used by different users, and (c) helps to render a valid ISPD and structure it in a useful way. The conclusion regarding acquiring a similar understanding of the domain is based on the observations that (1) during the presentations and workshops, the participants asked meaningful questions, i.e. they all understood the model in a way it was intended, (2) both the novices and the experts in the domain were able to understand the model and use it as intended; (3) the participants were able to use the model while working in a team, i.e. within a team there was an agreed-upon understanding of the domain and its main concepts, and of the way how it must be applied to a specific case, and (4) all six teams of the workshops' participants developed meaningful security policy statements which all had a resemblant format, i.e. the understanding of the RMIAS and the way it must be used for the development of an ISPD for a specific case was also coherent among the teams.
There are a number of limitations to the evaluation process which are outlined below. The evaluation was conducted by the team including the authors of the RMIAS who were inevitably biased. To deal with this, we used a well defined evaluation methodology and through documentation of the process as well as of the interviews and feedback. The results of interviews may be affected by many factors [43] including the command of language and background of both interviewee and interviewer, the inconsistent interpretation of terminology, the lack of motivation, etc. In this research project, although the participants were not financially or in any other way motivated to participate in the evaluation process, they demonstrated, as mentioned above, a profound interest in the RMIAS, and readily and actively participated in its evaluation.
It may be debated how well the MSc students, who were involved in the evaluation, stand proxy for a novice audience. Although the group at Cardiff University had no practical experience in IAS, they already were taught several modules on IAS by the time the evaluation took place. Hence, although they knowledge was limited, they were not complete novices to IAS.
Finally, there were a number of critical comments regarding the RMIAS received during the interviewing process. All the comments are discussed in the proceeding sections. In this paper, the RMIAS is presented in the same form as it was presented to the experts interviewed.
The RMIAS was not modified according to the comments and this will be done as a part of future work.
Conclusions
The evaluation presented in the paper at hand verifies the hypothesis declared in Section 1 and confirms that (1) the RMIAS provides more complete and accurate representation of the IAS domain, than the existing conceptual models of the IAS domain; (2) the RMIAS reflects the IAS domain as it is understood by the majority of the experts interviewed; and The evaluation of conceptual and reference models is a challenging task and is a research topic attracting the close attention of research community [7, 1, 48] . The multifaceted and multi-criteria evaluation carried out in this research project to verify the quality of the RMIAS provides a rigorous example of an evaluation process. This evaluation process used is justi- Summing up, the contribution of this paper is three-fold: (1) a review of the conceptual models of the IAS domain in terms of their evaluation; (2) the development and implementation of a procedure for a multifaceted, multi-criteria evaluation of a reference model, and (3) the evaluation of the RMIAS and the corroboration of its validity.
